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This is the second of a two-part article on the polygraph, psychological stress evaluator, and truth serum.

The Valdez conditions have been adopted by many
of the courts that admit stipulated polygraph results.
E.g., Wynn v. State, 423 So. 2d 294, 300 (Ala. Grim.
App. 1982); State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St. 2d 123, 134,
372 N.E.2d 1318, 1323 (1978). Several courts have
altered the conditions in some respects. For example,
an oral agreement in open court in lieu of a written
agreement is recognized by some courts. Wynn v.
State, 423 So. 2d 294, 299 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982);
State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 587 (Iowa 1980); State
v. Roach, 223 Kan. 732,736, 576 P.2d 1082, 1086
(1978). In addition, a warning that the defendant is
waiving his right against self-incrimination is also required by other courts. Wynn v. State, 423 So. 2d 294,
299 (Ala. Grim. App. 1982).
The interpretation of the stipulation has raised a
number of issues. E.g., Young v. State, 387 So. 2d
512, 512-13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (experts in addition to examiner not permitted to testify because their
testimony was not part of the stipulation); Porterfield v.
State, 150 Ga. App. 303, 257 S.E.2d 372, 373 (1979)
(testimony concerning inconclusive results not admissible because not part of the stipulation). These cases
highlight the importance of drafting the stipulation with
care. For example, an agreement to admit the results
of a polygraph examination conducted by a compete!]t
examiner does not encompass an examination by an ·
examiner who is not licensed under the applicable
state statute. Holcomb v. State, 268 Ark. 138, 140, 594
S.W.2d 22, 23 (1980); State v. Tavernier, 27 Or. App.
115, 118, 555 P.2d 481, 482 (1976). An agreement to
admit the results of an examination permits the prosecution to use the results in his case-in-chief in the
absence of a statement limiting the results to impeachment. White v. State, 269 Ind. 479, 483-84, 381
N.E.2d 481, 484-85 (1978); State v. Baskerville, 139
N.J. Super. 389, 394, 354 A.2d 328, 330 (1976).
Moreover, some courts have held that the agreement must be strictly construed; thus, when the state

failed to comply with a stipulation that required the
defense attorney to review all questions, the results of
the examination were inadmissible. Chambers v. State,
146 Ga. App. 126, 128, 245 S.E.2d 467, 469 (1978).
The argument for construing a stipulation strictly
against the state is based on constitutional grounds:
"Where an accused waives his constitutional right to
remain silent in exchange for an agreement that his
statements will not be used under certain conditions
which are fulfilled, the bargain made by the State will
be enforced." State v. Fuller, 387 So. 2d 1040, 1041-42
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
One other issue that has arisen in the stipulation
cases deserves comment. In People v. Reeder, 129
Cal. Rptr 646 (1976), the court held that a defense
counsel "who, in advance of the examination, stipulates that a defendant will submit to a polygraph examination and the results will be admissible at trial
demonstrates incompetence." !d. at 648. This decision
was subsequently vacated and the defendant's incompetency claim rejected. People v. Reeder, 65 Cal.
App. 3d 235, 135 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1976). Later cases
have also rejected such claims. For example, in one
case the court held that when counsel agrees to an
examination after the defendant insists on his innocence, there is no incompetence. People v. Berry, 118
Cal. App. 3d 122, 134, 173 Cal. Rptr. 137, 143, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 966 (1981). See generally Annat., 9
A.L.R.4th 354 (1981).
Discretionary Admissibility
A few trial courts have admitted polygraph evidence
without a stipulation. E.g., United States v. Ridling,
350 F. Supp. 90, 99 (E.D. Mich. 1972); People v.
Daniels, 422 N.Y.S.2d 832, 837 (S. Ct. 1979); State v.
Sims, 52 Ohio Misc. 31, 369 N.E.2d 24 (Ohio C.P.
1977).
Moreover, several appellate courts have recognized
a trial court's discretion to admit polygraph evidence
even in the absence of a stipulation. The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly taken this position: United States
v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 767 (7th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Black, 684 F.2d 481, 484 (7th Cir.), cert.
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denied, 103 S. Ct. 463 (1982); United States v. Rumell,
642 F.2d 213, 215 (7th Cir; 1981) (citing other cases).
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a similar position:
United States v. Falsia, 724 F.2d 1339, 1341 (9th Cir.
1983}; United St.ates v. Ferris, 719 F.2d 1405, 1408 (9th
Cir. 1983}; United States v. Estrada-Lucas, 651 F.2d
1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 1980}; United States v. Marshall,
526 F.2d 1349, 1360 (9th Cir. 1975}, cert. denied, 426
U.S. 923 (1976}. In most cases, however, trial courts
have exercised this discretion by excluding polygraph
evidence.
Two jurisdictions, Massachusetts and New Mexico,
have upheld the admissibility of polygraph evidence
without stipulation. In Commonwealth v. A Juvenile,
365 Mass 421, 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974}, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held polygraph evidence admissible if the defendant agrees in advance
to the admission of test results and the trial judge
conducts a "close and searching inquiry" into the
qualifications of the examiner, the methods employed
in the examination, and the suitability of the defendant
for testing. /d. at 426, 313 N.E.2d at 124. In subsequent cases, the court further defined the conditions
under which unstipulated results may be admitted.
First, if the defendant has already taken an examination, he must agree that the results of a new examination are admissible. Commonwealth v. Stewart, 375
Mass. 380, 384, 377 N.E.2d 693, 697 (1978). Second,
the results of the examination cannot be admitted as
substantive evidence; they affect only the credibility of
the defendant. Thus, the defendant must testify before
the results are admissible. Commonwealth v. Vitello,
376 Mass. 426, 450-52, 381 N.E.2d 582, 597-98 (1978};
accord Commonwealth v. Moynihan, 376 Mass. 468,
478-79, 381 N.E.2d 575, 581 (1978}. Third, admissibility
is restricted to the defendant; polygraph evidence concerning a witness is not admissible. Commonwealth v.
DiLego, 387 Mass. 394, 439 N.E.2d 807, 808 (1982).
Finally, under some circumstances an indigent defendant is entitled to an examination at state expense.
Commonwealth v. Lockley, 381 Mass. 156, 160-61, 408
N.E.2d 834, 838-39 (1980}.
New Mexico has gone the furthest in admitting
polygraph evidence. In State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184,
539 P.2d 204 (1975), the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that polygraph results are admissible if (1} the
operator was qualified, (2) the testing procedures were
reliable, and (3) the test of the particular subject was
valid. /d. at 184-85, 539 P.2d at 205. See also State v.
Urioste, 94 N.M. 767, 700, 617 P.2d 156, 159 (1980) (error to preclude cross-examination of examiner concerning chart and scoring); State v. Bell, 90 N.M. 134,
138-39, 560 P.2d 925, 929-30 (1977) (inconclusive results are irrelevant and therefore inadmissible).
Currently, New Mexico Evidence Rule 707 governs
admissibility. This rule permits the admissibility of
polygraph evidence in the discretion of the trial court
under the following conditions. First, the examination
must be conducted by a qualified examiner. Minimum
qualifications include five years' experience administering or interpreting polygraph examinations or
equivalent academic training and at least twenty hours
of continuing education during the twelve months prior

to the examination offered in evidence. N.M. Evid. R.
707(b). Second, the examination must include at least
two relevant questions, at least three charts, and be
quantitatively scored. N.M. Evid. R. 707(c). Moreover,
the pre-test interview and actual testing must be recorded in full on an audio or video recording device.
N.M. Evid. R. 707(e). Third, the party intending to offer
the evidence generally must provide ten-day written
notice to the other party, including copies of the examiner's report, each chart, the audio or video recording of the pre-test interview and actual testing, and a
list of any prior examinations taken by the subject.
N.M. Evid. R. 707(d).
Constitutional Arguments
Several constitutional arguments have been advanced to support the admissibility of polygraph evidence.
See generally Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense:
An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal
Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 713, 810-15 (1976); Note, Compulsory Process and Polygraph Evidence: Does
Exclusion Violate a Criminal Defendant's Due Process
Rights?, 12 Conn. L. Rev. 324 (1980); Note, Admission
of Polygraph Results: A Due Process Perspective, 55
Ind. L.J. 157 (1979); Note, State v. Dean, A Compulsory
Process Analysis of the Inadmissibility of Polygraph
Evidence, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 237.
The principal constitutional argument focuses on the
defendant's right to present a defense. In State v.
Dorsey, 87 N.M. 323, 532 P.2d 912, 914-15 (N.M. Ct.
App.), aff'd on other grounds, 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d
204 (1975), a New Mexico appellate court reversed a
trial court's exclusion of polygraph evidence on the
grounds that a defendant has a due process right to
present critical and reliable defense evidence. In
Jackson v. Garrison 495 F. Supp. 9 (W.D.N.C. 1979),
rev'd, 677 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1981), a federal district
court held that the exclusion of polygraph evidence
denied a defendant a fair trial. In State v. Sims, 52
Ohio Misc. 31, 32, 369 N.E.2d 24, 46 (C.P. 1977), an
Ohio trial court found an implied right to present
defense evidence in the compulsory process
guarantee, which, it concluded, compelled the admission of defense polygraph evidence. The precedential
value of these cases, however, is not strong. Jackson
was overruled on appeal, Jackson v. Garrison, 677
F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1981), Dorsey was affirmed but not
on constitutional grounds, State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M.
184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975), and Sims is inconsistent with
later Ohio cases. Although the Ohio Supreme Court
accepted the admission of stipulated polygraph results
in State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St. 2d 123, 372 N.E.2d 1318
(1978), it rejected the constitutional arguments for admission in State v. Levert, 58 Ohio St. 2d 213, 215,
389 N.E.2d 848, 850 (1979).
The right to present defense evidence also was
cited in McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.
1981), in which the defendant offered to stipulate to
the admission of a polygraph examination. Although
stipulated polygraph results were admissible under
state law at that time, the prosecutor, without offering
any reasons, refused to stipulate. In granting habeas
corpus relief, the Seventh Circuit wrote: "Where credi2
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bility is as critical as in the instant case, the circumstances are such as to make the polygraph evidence
materially exculpatory within the meaning of the Constitution." /d. at 462. The court, however, rested its
decision on narrower grounds; that is, the prosecution's refusal to stipulate without offering a valid
ground for the refusal deprived the defendant of due
process: "From all that appears, [the prosecutor] was
acting solely for tactical reasons in the belief that a
test would not be helpful to his case. If the prosecutor
refuses and states reasons, it then becomes the duty
of the court to determine whether the reasons offered
rise above the purely tactical considerations present in
a given case." /d. at 466.
The response to McMorris has been chilly. Justice
Rehnquist characterized McMorris as a "dubious constitutional holding." Israel v. McMorris, 455 U.S. 967,
970 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). Some courts simply reject the argument
that the prosecution is required to provide reasons for
its refusal to stipulate. See Jones v. Weldon, 690 F.2d
835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982). Other courts reject the
broader proposition that there is a constitutional right
to present polygraph evidence. See Bashor v. Risley,
730 F.2d 1228, 1238 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Gordon, 688 F.2d 42, 44 (8th Cir. 1982); Milano v. Garrison, 677 F.2d 374, 375 (4th Cir. 1981); Jackson v.
Garrison, 677 F.2d 371, 373 (4th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857, 867 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 860 (1979); Conner v. Auger, 595 F.2d
407, 411 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 851 (1979);
United States v. Bohr, 581 F.2d 1294, 1303 (8th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978); People v.
Williams, 333 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Mich App. 1983).
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit itself has noted that
McMorris applies only where a jurisdiction accepts
stipulated polygraph results, United States v. Black,
684 F.2d 481, 483 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
463 (1982), and does not change the trial court's
discretionary authority to exclude polygraph evidence.
United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 767 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 352 (1983); United States v.
Lupo, 652 F.2d 723, 729 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
457 u.s. 1135 (1982).
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Det. J. Urb. L. 155 (1977).
Some of these courts have distinguished such proceedings from the trial itself. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court has held polygraph evidence
admissible on a motion for a new trial although the
same evidence is inadmissible at trial. People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 411-14, 255 N.W.2d 171, 197-98
(1977). According to the court, polygraph results may
be of some assistance to the trial judge in deciding
issues that typically arise in proceedings to determine
whether a new trial should be granted: "Traditionally,
the testimony of recanting or suddenly discovered
witnesses has been highly suspect, largely because it
is impossible to determine when the truth is being
told. The polygraph won't do this either; not even its
most ardent proponents would so contend. But it
might help." /d. at 415, 255 N.W.2d at 199. The court
also commented that admissibility in this context
would provide an "opportunity to test [the] effectiveness of the polygraph ...." /d.
RELATED ISSUES

Fifth Amendment
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the
U.S. Supreme Court indicated, albeit in dictum, that
compelled submission to a polygraph test would violate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination:
Some tests seemingly directed to obtain "physical
evidence," for example, lie detector tests measuring
changes in body function during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial. To compel a person to submit to testing
in which an effort will be made to determine his guilt or
innocence on the basis of physiological responses,
whether willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of
the Fifth Amendment. /d. at 764.

The courts that have admitted polygraph evidence
have recognized the applicability of the privilege in
this context: "The polygraph results are essentially
testimonial in nature and therefore a defendant could
not be compelled initially to take such an examination
on the Commonwealth's motion." Commonwealth v. A
Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 431, 313 N.E.2d 120, 127
(1974). The protection of the privilege would also extend to any comment on a defendant's refusal to submit to an examination. See Bowen v. Eyman, 324 F.
Supp. 339, 341 (D. Ariz. 1970); MacDonald v. State,
164 Ind. App. 285, 293-94, 328 N.E.2d 436, 441 (1975).
The defendant, however, may waive the privilege. See
United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 734-36 (8th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976); United States
v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 97 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 431-32, 313
N.E.2d 120, 127 (1974).

Proceedings Other Than Trial
Courts have admitted polygraph evidence at suppression hearings, People v. Cutter, 12 Grim. L. Rep.
2133 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1972), sentence hearings,
State v. Jones, 110 Ariz. 546, 551,521 P.2d 978, 983,
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1004 (1974); State v. Watson, 115
N.J. Super. 213, 218, 278 A.2d 543, 546 (Hudson Cty.
Ct. 1971), and hearings for new trials. State v.
Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 982-83 (La. 1979); People v.
Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 412-14, 255 N.W.2d 171,
197-99 (1977); People v. Snell, 118 Mich. App. 750, 768,
325 N.W.2d 563, 572 (1982); State v. Yodsnukis, 281
N.W.2d 255, 259-60 (N.D. 1979); State v. Olmstead,
261 N.W.2d 880, 886 (N.D.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918
(1978). See generally Note, People v. Barbara: The Admissibility of Polygraph Test Results in Support of a
Motion for New Trial, 1978 Det. C.L. Rev. 347; Note,
Polygraph Examination Results Admissible in PostConviction Hearings, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 380 (1978); 55 U.

Confessions
It is not uncommon for a defendant to make an incriminatory statement before, during, or after a polygraph examination has been administered. Since
polygraph examinations involve testimonial evidence
under the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, the admissibility of statements made
during the examination process may be subject to the
3
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A determinative factor in the reported cases has
been the existence of a statute requiring court approval for dismissals. When a trial court approved the
dismissal or was cognizant of the agreement, appellate courts have held the prosecutor bound by the
agreement on public policy grounds. Butler v. State,
228 So. 2d 421, 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); State v.
Davis, 188 So. 2d 24, 28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966);
People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 318, 235 N.W.2d
581, 587 (1975). According to these courts, the agreement represents a "pledge of public faith - a promise
made by state officials - and one that should not be
lightly disregarded." State v. Davis, 188 So. 2d 24, 27
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). On the other hand, when
court approval was required but not obtained, prosecution has been permitted even though a defendant successfully passed the examination. State v. Sanchell,
191 Neb. 505, 510, 216 N.W. 2d 504, 508 (1974) cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975). See also Snead v. State,
415 So. 2d 887, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (oral
agreement with Sheriff who lacked authority to enter
into such an agreement is not enforceable).
Notwithstanding the Jack of court approval, enforcement of such an agreement may be required on constitutional grounds. In agreeing to take a polygraph examination, the defendant waives his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and it seems questionable that the state could induce such a waiver by
promising to dismiss the charges in the event the defendant passes the examination and then renege on
that promise after the defendant has waived his constitutional rights. Ct. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257 (1971) (enforceability of plea bargain); see also
Mabry v. Johnson, 104 S. Ct. 2543 (1984).

Miranda warnings. Miranda warnings are required only
if the defendant is in custody, Berkemer v. McCarty,
104 S. Ct. 3138, 3145 {1984); California v. Beheler, 103
S. Ct. 3517, 3519 (1983), and subjected to interrogation. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 {1980). The
defendant, however, may waive his right to remain
silent and to counsel when he agrees to take a polygraph examination. See United States v. Iron Thunder,
714 F.2d 765, 771-72 (8th Cir. 1983); Henry v. Dees,
658 F.2d 406, 408 (5th Cir. 1981) (waiver invalid where
examiner asked questions of a mentally retarded
defendant that went beyond agreement to take
examination).
Even if the defendant initially asserts his right to
counsel after receiving Miranda warnings, he may
subsequently waive that right by initiating conversations with the police, including a request for a polygraph examination. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S.
Ct. 2830 (1983). In Wyrick v. Fields, 103 S. Ct. 394
(1982), the U.S. Supreme Court held that admissions
made by a defendant during a post-test interview were
admissible where the defendant, who was represented
by counsel, requested a polygraph examination and
was informed of his Miranda rights. The Court rejected
the argument that new warnings were required prior to
the post-test interview. However, not all statements that
are made after an examination are necessarily admissible; they are admissible only if the defendant
voluntarily and knowingly waives his rights to remain
silent and to counsel. See United States v. Gillyard,
726 F.2d 1426, 1429-30 (9th Cir. 1984) (defendant did
not validly waive right to a post-test interrogation by officers other than the examiner).
In addition to Fifth Amendment Miranda rights, a
defendant's admissions during a polygraph examination may be excluded if they are obtained in violation
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Fields v.
Wyrick, 706 F.2d 879, 880-81 (8th Cir. 1983) (defendant
waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel), or are
involuntary under the due process clause. See generally Annot., 89 A.L.R.3d 230 (1979). Moreover, some
courts have held that polygraph evidence is admissible for the limited purpose of showing the voluntariness of a confession. See United States v. Kampiles,
609 F.2d 1233, 1244-45 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 954 (1980); Annot. 92 A.L.R.3d 1317 (1979).

STATUTORY DEVELOPMENTS
The admissibility of polygraph evidence is the subject of legislation in a few jurisdictions. The most important example is New Mexico Evidence Rule 707,
which makes polygraph evidence admissible in the
discretion of the trial court under certain conditions.
Another example is section 351.1 of the California
Evidence Code which makes polygraph results inadmissible "unless all the parties stipulate to the admission of such results." Cal. Evid. Code§ 351.1 (West
Supp. 1984). Finally, a Wisconsin statute recognizes a
privilege for all "oral and written communications during or any results of an examination using an honesty
testing device...." Wis. Stat. Ann. § 905.065 (West
Supp. 1984-85).
These provisions are the exceptions rather than the
rule. The more common statutory treatment of the
polygraph involves licensure statutes. The significance
of these provisions relates to the establishment of
minimum standards for licensing. Ala. Code §
34-25-21 (Supp. 1984); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2207
(1979); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 493.566 (West 1981); Ga.
Code Ann. § 43-36-6 (1984); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111, §
2412 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 329.030 (Baldwin 1984); Mich Comp. Laws Ann. §
338.1710 (West 1976); Miss. Code Ann. § 73-29-13
(1972); Mont. Code Ann. § 37-62-202 (1983); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 648A.130 (1983); N.D. Cent. Code §43-31-07

Pretrial Agreements
In a few reported cases prosecutors have gone
beyond stipulating to the admissibility of test results
and have agreed to the dismissal of charges on the
condition that the defendant pass a polygraph examination. See generally Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 1280
(1971). In some cases the defendant had no obligations under such an agreement other than to cooperate in the examination. People v. Reagan, 395 Mich.
306, 309, 235 N.W.2d 581, 583 (1975); State v. Sanchell, 191 Neb. 505, 509-10 216 N.W.2d 504, 507-08
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975). In other
cases the defendant either agreed to admit the test
results, Butler v. State, 228 So. 2d 421, 424-25 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1969), or to enter a plea to a reduced
charge in the event he failed the examination, State v.
Davis, 188 So. 2d 24, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
4

Although PSE might be considered a "voice lie
detector," it differs from a polygraph in a number of
respects. Unlike the polygraph, a person can be subjected to PSE without being "hooked up" to the evaluator, without knowledge that the test is being conducted, and the evaluation is not limited to yes and no
responses. More importantly, the validity of this type of
examination is even more suspect than polygraphy. Although some studies support the validity of PSE evidence, independent studies of the technique have
consistently challenged its validity. For example, in one
study the PSE "failed to perform at a level better than
chance expectancy...." Timm, The Efficacy of the
Psychological Stress Evaluator in Detecting Deception,
11 J. Police Sci. & Ad. 62, 65 (1983}. In another study,
the investigators concluded that "in no test of the
present study was the PSE-criteria correspondence
... or the differences between PSE evaluations and
chance decisions and between correct and incorrect
evaluations significant, as to support the claim for
PSE validity as a detector of psychological stress."
Nachson & Feldman, Vocal Indices of Psychological
Stress: A Validation Study of the Psychological Stress
Evaluator, 8 J. Police Sci. & Ad. 40, 50 (1980}. Another
commentator concluded that "the promise of voice
stress analysis in the lie detection field is not and may
never be a reality. All of the reliable evidence now
available shows that none of the voice stress devices
is useful in detecting deception ...." Horvath, Detecting Decepting: The Promise and Reality of Voice Stress
Analysis, 27 J. Forensic Sci. 340, 349 (1982}. See also
D. Lykken, supra, at 159 ("There is no scientifically
credible evidence that the PSE ... can reliably
measure difference in 'stress' as reflected in the
human voice."}.

(Supp. 1983}; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 59, § 1458 (West
Supp. 1984-85}; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
4413(29cc} § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1984}. See generally
Annat., 32 A.L.R.3d 1324 (1970} (polygraph licensing
statutes}.
The statutes will presumably play a role in determining the qualifications of experts in those jurisdictions
that admit polygraph evidence, either in the discretion
of the trial court or by stipulation. See Holcomb v.
State, 268 Ark. 138, 140, 594 S.W.2d 22, 23 (1980}
(stipulation interpreted to require a licensed examiner};
State v. Tavernier, 27 Or. App. 115, 118, 555 P.2d 481,
482 (1976) (same}. Typically, these statutes establish
requirements relating to age, citizenship, character,
and academic or investigative experience. Requirements governing polygraph schooling and internships
are also common. In some jurisdictions the statute
merely establishes an administrative agency which is
responsible for the promulgation of rules governing
polygraph examiners. E.g., Va. Code §§ 54-916 to
54-922 (1982}. Moreover, some provisions go beyond
establishing qualification standards and prescribe the
types of testing procedures that must be used in ad- .
ministering polygraph examinations. For example, the
Nevada statute provides that only examinations conducted with approved instruments using standard and
widely accepted techniques and using at least two
charts may be administered. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§
648A.200, .230 & .250 (1983}.

~

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS EVALUATOR
Psychological Stress Evaluation (PSE}, which was
developed in the early 1970s, is another technique used to detect deception. See generally L. Taylor, Scientific Interrogation ch. 11 (1984}; Kenety, The Psychological Stress Evaluator: The Theory, Validity and Legal
Status of an Innovative "Lie Detector," 55 Ind. L.J. 349
(1980}; Note, The Psychological Stress Evaluator:
Yesterday's Dream - Tomorrow's Nightmare, 24 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 299 (1975}; Note, The Psychological Stress
Evaluator: A Recent Development in Lie Detector Technology, 7 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 332 (1974}.
PSE is based on the theory that a person's voice
changes when that person is being deceptive; that is,
the emotional stress accompanying the deception will
produce physiological responses that can be recorded
and analyzed. In this respect, PSE is similar to the
polygraph. PSE measures changes in frequency modulations of the voice (microtremors}, the inaudible
component of the voice produced by muscles in
speech production. As stress increases, frequency
modulation decreases. In this respect, PSE differs
from polygraphy because it measures only one physiological response.
The procedure used in PSE involves the audio
recording of a person's voice and the transmitting of
that recording into a voice stress evaluator. The
evaluator receives the electronically transduced
speech patterns, analyzes them, and registers the
results on chart paper. The examiner then evaluates
the chart for indications of stress (decreases in microtremors} and then determines whether deception is
present.

A number of courts have considered the admissibility of PSE evidence. The overwhelming majority of
these courts have rejected such evidence. Some
courts have held that PSE evidence has not achieved
general acceptance in the scientific community and
thus is inadmissible under the Frye test. Barrel of Fun.,
Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty, 739 F.2d 1028,
1032 (5th Cir. 1984}; United States v. Traficant, 566 F.
Supp. 1046, 1047 (N.D. Ohio 1983); United States v.
Bothwell, 17 M.J. 684, 688 (A.C.M.R. 1983}; Smith v.
State, 31 Md. App. 106, 119-20, 355 A.2d 527, 535
(1976}.
Others have simply concluded that PSE is not
reliable. State v. Naas, 409 So. 2d 535, 548 (La. 1981};
State v. Thompson, 381 So. 2d 823, 824 (La. 1980};
State v. Schouest, 351 So.2d 462, 469 (La. 1977};
State v. Ochalla, 285 N.W.2d 683, 684 (Minn. 1979);
State v. Milano, 297 N.C. 485, 500, 256 S.E.2d 154,
163 (1979}; Caldwell v. State, 267 Ark. 1053, 1060, 594
S.W.2d 24, 28 (1980}; People v. Tarsi a, 50 N .Y.2d 1,
405 N.E.2d 188, 191, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944, 946 (1980};
State v. Makerson, 52 N.C. App. 149, 153, 277 S.E.2d
869, 872 (1981); ct. Heisse v. Vermont, 519 F. Supp. 36,
46 (D. Vt. 1980} (statute limiting licenses to polygraph
examiners is rationally based on its wider acceptance
of reliability}.
In contrast to the majority rule, the New Mexico
Supreme Court has ruled PSE evidence admissible in
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the discretion of the trial court provided the offering
party introduces evidence concerning (1) the qualifications and expertis~ of the examiner, (2) the reliability
of the testing procedure employed as approved by authorities in the field, and (3) the validity of the test
made in the particular case. Simon Neustadt Family
Center, Inc. v. Bludworth, 97 N.M. 500, 504, 641 P.2d
531, 535 (1982). Thus, the New Mexico Supreme Court
has adopted the same liberal approach to the admissibility of PSE evidence that it had previously embraced
with polygraph evidence.

E.g., Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893, 895-96

(9th Cir. 1956); Fetters v. State, 436 A.2d 796, 800 (Del
1981); Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365, 373 (Fla. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982); State v. Linn, 93
Idaho 430, 433, 462 P.2d 729, 732 (1969); State v.
Adams, 218 Kan. 495, 580, 545 P.2d 1134, 1144 (1976);
Reed v. State, 644 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App.
1983); Cain v. State, 549 S.W.2d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977). See generally 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence§
998 (Chadbourn rev. 1970) (listing cases); Annat., 41
. A.L.R.3d 1369 (1972).
This rule of exclusion also extends to the testimony
of experts that a defendant was telling the truth while
under the influence of such drugs. E.g., Harper v.
State, 249 Ga. 519, 526, 292 S.E.2d 389, 396 (1982);
People v. Cox, 85 Mich. App. 314, 317, 271 N.W.2d
216, 218 (1978); Merritt v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d
727, 729-30 (Ky. 1965). A different evidentiary issue is
involved when an expert offers an opinion about a
subject's mental state based on an examination that
included the use of "truth serum" drugs. Some courts
permit expert testimony in this situation. See People v.
Cartier, 51 Cal. 2d 590, 601, 335 P.2d 114, 122 (1959);
State v. White, 60 Wash. 2d 551, 374 P.2d 942, 950-53
(1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963). But see People v. Ford, 304 N.Y. 679, 681-82, 107 N.E.2d 595,
596-97 (1952).
Finally, the use of "truth serum" drugs to induce a
confession is challengeable on due process grounds.
As the U.S. Supreme Court has remarked: "It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a confession
would be less the product of a free intellect, less
voluntary, than when brought about by a drug having
the effect of a 'truth serum.' " Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 307-08 (1963); see also People v. Johnson,
32 Cal. App. 3d 988, 1002 109 Cal. Rptr. 118, 127
(1973).

TRUTH SERUM
So-called ''truth serums" involve the use of drugs,
such as scopolamine, sodium amytal, sodium pentothal, and brevital sodium, that are central nervous system depressants. See generally L. Taylor, Scientific Investigation ch. 10 (1984); Dession, Freedman, Donnelly & Redlich, Drug-Induced Revelation and Criminal Investigation, 62 Yale L.J. 315 (1952); Polen, The Admissibility of Ti'uth Serum Tests in the Courts, 35 Temp.
L.Q. 401 (1962); Note, An Analysis of the Limited Legal
Value of Ti'uth Serum, 11 Syracuse L. Rev. 64 (1959).
These drugs temporarily alter the subject's psychological state in such a way as "to induce a relaxed
state of mind in which the suspect becomes more
talkative and has less emotional control." MacDonald,
Ti'uth Serum, 46 J. Crim. L., Criminology & Police Sci.
259 (1955). The efficacy of "truth serums" as a
method of lie detection has been viewed with skepticism by many commentators:
[E]xperimental and clinical findings indicate that only individuals who have conscious and unconscious reasons
for doing so are inclined to confess and yield to interrogation under drug influence. On the other hand, some are
able to withhold information and some, especially character neurotics, are able to lie. Others are so suggestible
they will describe, in response to suggestive questioning,
behavior which never in fact occurred. Notwithstanding
these limitations, a drug-induced interview may be a valuable adjunct to an otherwise thorough psychiatric examination. In some instances it may enable a psychiatrist to
ascertain more quickly the depth and type of mental illness. But drugs are not "truth sera." They lessen inhibitions to verbalization and stimulate unrepressed expression not only of fact but of fancy and suggestion as well.
Thus the material produced is not "truth" in the sense
that it conforms to empirical fact. Dession, Freedman,
Donnelly & Redlich, supra, at 319.
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The courts have uniformly rejected the admissibility
of statements made by a person while under the influence of "truth serum" drugs when those statements
are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
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